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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT P. MORRIS and GUMP 
& AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC., 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
vs. 
JOHN PRICE ASSOCIATES, INC., Case No. 15660 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Pursuant to Rule 76(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
appellant above-named hereby petitions this Court for a 
re-hearing of the appeal in this cause. 
This petition is made on the grounds and for the reason 
that the majority opinion of this Court filed January 11, 
1979, places this case in a procedural posture which renders 
the case and the result reached by the majority herein, in 
direct conflict with the Court's prior decision in A. J. Li~ 
v. Federated Milk Producers Assn., 23 Utah 2d 222, 461 P.2d 
290 (1969). 
This petition is supported by the Brief of Appellant 
filed herewith. ¥ 
DATED this~ day of January, 1979. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
. ct:JSJ-
Attorneys 
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STATUS OF THE CASE 
The appeal in this action was filed February 1, 1978. 
The issues were briefed and the matter was argued before 
this Court on December 12, 1978. The opinion of this 
Court was filed January 11, 1979. The decision was split, 
with Justice Ellett writing a vigorous dissent. The 
Petition for Re-hearing was timely filed on January 26, 
1979. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT'S OPINION CREATES A DIRECT CONFLICT 
WITH PRIOR DECISIONS OF THIS COURT. 
In the opinion which has been filed in this case, 
the Justices of this Court unanimously agreed that as to 
plaintiff Robert P. Morris, the action should have been 
dismissed at the trial level. The Court then reversed the 
lower court with respect to plaintiff Morris and dismissed 
the action as to him, but affirmed the lower court's judgment 
as to plaintiff Gump & Ayers, Justice Ellett dissenting. 
With the dismissal of Morris, the case then falls directly 
within the rule previously enunciated by this Court in 
A. J. Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Assn., 23 Utah 2d 222, 
461 P.2d 290 (1969). However, the result reached by the 
Court in the instant case is directly contrary to the result 
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reached in Limb. The cases have virtually identical facts. 
In Limb, the defendant had e~tered into a letter 
commission agreement with one John Williamson who was 
employed by the plaintiff as a real estate salesman. The 
plaintiff was a licensed real estate broker. The operative 
language of the commission agreement letter which is set 
forth in the opinion is almost identical to the language 
contained in the controversial letter in the instant case. 
Essentially, the letter guaranteed Mr. Williamson a 5% 
commission if the Cloverleaf Dairy on South State Street was 
sold to any one of the six listed purchasers. The letter 
did not require Mr. Williamson to make the sale. Two years 
after the letter had issued, the subject property was sold 
to one of the listed purchasers by another realtor. Limb 
then made claim for a commission. 
At the trial level, both Limb and Williamson were 
listed as plaintiffs in the case. However, the case was 
dismissed as to Williamson on the trial level for the same 
reasons that Morris was dismissed out in this action. The 
trial court, per Wilkins, J., then granted Summary Judgment 
to the defendant. On appeal, this court affirmed, noting 
that the contract was with the salesman and since the 
salesman was not a party, the broker could not substitute 
himself as a party to the contract. The court stated: 
-2-
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It is, therefore, evident that Mr. Williamson 
being only a real estate salesman could not 
collect a fee from the defendant and that the 
promise to pay him would be unenforceable. Mr. 
Limb attempts to substitute himself as a party 
and collect on a joint contract. 461 P.2d at 
292. 
The court further stated that: 
Even if the contract were not void, Mr. Limb 
could not recover in this case. Mr. Williamson 
was not a broker but was attempting to act as 
one when he secured the letter from the defendant. 
A broker employed by an owner to purchase or 
sell real property bears a fiduciary relationship 
to his employer, and the applicable law is stated 
• to be: 
If the contract made by an agent acting for 
an undisclosed principal involves elements of 
personal trust and confidence as a considera-
tion moving from the agent, contracting in his 
own name, to the other party to the contract, 
the principal, while the contract remains 
executory, cannot, against the resistance of 
the other party, enforce it, either to compel 
performance by the other party or to recover 
damages for breach. Id. at 292, 293. 
It may be argued that the instant case is distinguishable 
from Limb on the facts because the letter in the present case 
was addressed to Mr. Rob Morris at Gump & Ayers and there-
fore Gump & Ayers was a party to the contract. However, as 
noted in the dissent of Justice Ellett the grammar of the 
letter here clearly indicates that the letter was directed 
to Mr. Morris individually and not to him and his affiliated 
broker. Furthermore, the evidence is clear and undisputed 
-3-
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that such negotiations as there were took place with Morris 
alone and that the only reason Morris was involved at all 
was because of his long-time personal association with 
John Price. The record reflects and the evidence is that 
if a contract existed at all, it was with Rob Morris--not 
his corporate broker. 
The instant case is thus not unlike Limb. The evidence 
in Limb clearly showed that the parties knew Williamson 
worked for Limb as a salesman and was Limb's agent. Never-
theless, the court found that because the contract was 
negotiated with and directed to Williamson (Dear Sir:), it 
was a contract with him and not with his broker. The "Dear 
Rob:" letter at issue here is no different in its material 
aspects than the "Dear Sir:" letter in the Limb case. And 
yet, the court here has reached an opposite result. CF. 
Young v. Buchanan, 123 Utah 369, 259 P.2d 876 (1953). 
Had the trial court dismissed Morris from this case 
when defendant's summary judgment motion was made, the 
trial of the case would have taken a different tack. Even 
further and more explicit testimony respecting the intentions 
of the parties vis ~ vis who the contracting parties were 
would have been elicited. As it was, such testimony was of 
little immediate importance because at trial, the law of the 
case was that Morris was a proper party. Thus, the lower 
-4-
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court's error in failing to dismiss Morris as a party had 
a prejudicial effect upon defendant and the claims it could 
make and argue to the jury. Had Morris been dismissed it 
could have been effectively argued to the jury that based 
upon the evidence it was apparent that no contract existed 
with Gurnp & Ayers. This is very crucial because by the 
time negotiations commenced between defendant and IBM in 
late September of 1975, Morris had terminated his employment 
with Gurnp & Ayers. (Tr. p. 42). The broker-salesman 
relationship was thus terminated between plaintiffs and 
anything Morris did after August of 1975 was for his own 
account and not for Gurnp & Ayers. Because the evidence 
showed that at no time did anyone from Gump & Ayers do 
anything on this property other than Rob Morris, it could 
have been very effectively argued and defendant was entitled 
to argue that all Morris' alleged activity after his employ-
ment terminated with Gurnp & Ayers proved that he considered 
the contract to be with him rather than them. 
As it turned out, the lower court's ruling effectively 
precluded defendant from making this argument because the 
court had effectively ruled that defendant's liability to 
plaintiffs was joint and several so at that juncture and 
with Morris still in the suit, the argument was inapplicable. 
-5-
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RELIEF REQUESTED 
Appellant respectfully requests this court to vacate 
its majority opinion of January 11, 1979 and enter an order 
reversing the decision of the court below, or, in the 
alternative, for its order granting a new trial sans 
plaintiff Morris. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By~~==~~~~~-~~~~~~-George t 
Attorneys o Appellant 
John Price ssociates, Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the fore-
going Petition and Brief to John P. Ashton, of Prince, Yeates 
& Geldzahler, 455 South Third East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, this ).&'/-.__ day of January, 1979. 
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